Abstract: We show that two new key exchange protocols with security based on the triple decomposition problem may have security based on the MSCSP.
Introduction
Recently a new key exchange primitive based the triple DP (decomposition problem) is proposed in [1] and the triple DP is defined in [1] as finding the decomposition of a given element into three elements (that are not known).
One purpose of inventing the above scheme of [1] is its security is based on hard problems in braid groups such that a linear algebraic attack is not possible. It is claimed in [1] that the security of the new scheme is based on the triple DP in any G. If G is a group / the private keys are invertible then we show that the scheme in [1] is based on the CSP (conjugacy search problem) or the MSCSP (multiple simultaneous CSP) hence the algorithms in [1] are no more secure than using other key agreement algorithms using the CSP or MSCSP and hence the new scheme in [1] can be attacked feasibly using linear algebra if using braid groups (or the new scheme can be attacked with any algorithm that gives solutions of the CSP or MSCSP). There is a linear algebraic method to find solutions of the MSCSP which has been used to attack the braid key exchange protocol of Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld [2] and this attack can be used to attack the new scheme with linear algebra.
Description of the New Protocols Based on the Triple Decomposition Problem
In this section the protocols are described using original portions of sections 2 and 3 taken from the preprint [1] (hence the protocols are described as exactly as in [1] ).
Suggested Subgroup Parameters
In this section the protocols are described using original portions of sections 5 taken from the preprint [1] (hence the parameters are described as exactly as in [1] ).
Security Of the Protocols based on the Triple Decomposition Problem
If G is a group (it is suggested in [1] that G may be a group an example given in [1] for G is the braid group) or the private keys are invertible then we can show the following. In this section we give our new result that the security 
The First Protocol
For some integer K 1 and J I (J I may be braids) chosen by the attacker.
Compute
For some integer K 2 and T I chosen by the attacker. Observe the elements J I are chosen from the A 3 (because of the commutativity conditions of the protocols) and the elements T I are chosen from A 2 . To find
3 and now Bob's private key is known and so the secret shared key can be constructed. Hence from the systems of equations 1 and 2 the security of the protocol can be based on the MSCSP [3] (which includes the CSP) hence we have shown that the security of the new protocol in [1] is based on solving the MSCSP twice. A very similar derivation show the security of the new protocol is also based on two MSCSP with the unknowns a 1 and a 3 . An observation from the above is for any G the above the security of the protocol can also be based on (MSDSP) multiple simultaneous decomposition search problem for example (using the above computations) by solving the equations b 1 b 2 J I b 3 for b 3 , b 1 T I b 2 b 3 for b 1 and then solving for b 2 using b 1 and b 3 and using the publicly known information (again there is a similar result using Alice's private keys) and not the triple decomposition problem. Observe that for the possible specific parameters suggested in [1] satisfy commutativity conditions such as B 2 commutes with A 2 etc. in addition to the required commutativity conditions which are necessary for the protocol to work. We can use these above additional commutativity conditions to show the security can be based on the CSP as follows. We can solve MSCSP for a 1 and b 3 as described as above. Let O 2 = uvw = a 1 a 2 a 3 .
To recover the common secret key compute O −1
similarly
we can solve for above a 3 , b 1 by solving the CSP with b 1 b 2 , a 2 a 3 Or we can solve the 5,6 below for b 1 and a 3 as follows (so again the protocol can be based on the MSCSP). Attacker selects V I commuting with a 2 but not with a 3 or select
similarly the attacker selects W I commuting with b 2 but not with b 1 or select
The above result also holds when different subgroups are used that satisfy the additional commutativity conditions (described above) for an arbitrary G.
Observe that computing b 1 and b 3 from the MSCSP or CSP gives
3 ) (a 2 can be computed in a very similar way).
To defend against the attack in section 3.1 of reconstructing the secret shared key by solving the MSCSP the private keys of Alice, Bob are chosen so that they not invertible.
The Second Protocol
The derivation to show the second protocol can be based on the MSCSP is identical to the derivation for the first protocol except the elements J I are chosen from S y2 , the elements T I are chosen from S y1 etc. hence the above observations also applies to the second protocol. To defend against the attack in section 3.1 of reconstructing the secret shared key by solving the MSCSP all the elements in the private keys of Alice, Bob are chosen so that they are all not invertible.
Conclusion
We have shown that two new key exchange protocols with security based on the triple decomposition problem may have security based on the MSCSP or the MSDSP.
We sketch the proof for the attacks considering the suggestion of 5.2.2 in [1] . We recover Bob's private key as follows. 
